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Effet utile is one of the most contested terms in European case law. The present 
article empirically analyses its occurrences in the case law across time, legal fields and 
argumentative contexts. It thereby demonstrates that the main function of effet utile 
is to mitigate the entrenchment and extension of fundamental doctrines: primacy, 
direct effect and human rights. On this basis, the article argues that effet utile is 
primarily a rhetorical instrument used by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union to decouple legal principles from the practical effects of its decisions with the 
objective of persuading Member States to accept the authority of European law 
without compromising its normative coherence and continuity. The analysis is an 
important contribution to a comprehensive understanding of effet utile and offers a 
deeper insight into the long-term maintenance of supranational judicial authority.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The success of international and supranational courts hinges upon a 
capacity for yielding to national sensitivities and avoiding open conflict 
with major political actors. Yet, the authority of international and 
supranational courts relies on being able to demonstrate that they enforce 
the rule of law rather than the political interests of individual governments. 
Thus, effective and legitimate international and supranational adjudication 
largely depend on whether courts can balance the demands of law with the 
social, economic and political concerns of the individual states concerned.1    
 
The achievement of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the 
Court) has been extraordinary in this regard. It has experienced occasional 
friction with national governments and with courts in individual Member 
States; and it has been subjected to mounting academic criticism. 
However, the Court remains an influential political player that enjoys 
considerable interpretive (semantic) authority. Some accounts proffer it as 
one of the most powerful higher courts in the world.2 Various scholars 
(largely from the fields of social and political science) have explained the 
remarkable success of the Court with reference to broader historic trends3 
and political theory (functionalism). 4  Others have isolated individual 
factors such as the mobilization of transnational legal elites;5 the fostering 
of support from EURO-associations (in particular FIDE);6 the manner in 
which legalism as an approach to the study of law has underpinned the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* I thank Suvi Sankari, Anne Lise Kjær, Mikael Rask Madsen and two anonymous 
reviewers for discussions, helpful comments, and suggestions.  
1 Laurence R Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication’ (1997) 107 Yale LJ 273, 114. 
2 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘The European Court of Justice’, in P Craig and G De Búrca 
(eds), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011), 121.  
3 In particular the global diffusion of judicial constitutional review post World War 
II; see Martin Shapiro, ‘The European Court of Justice’ in P Craig and G De Burca 
(eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP 1999) 321. 
4 Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, ‘Europe before the Court: A Political 
Theory of Legal Integration’ (1993) 47 International Organization 41. 
5 Antoine Vauchez, ‘How to Become a Transnational Elite: Lawyers' Politics at the 
Genesis of the European Communities (1950-1970)’, in Hanne Petersen and others 
(eds), Paradoxes of European Legal Integration (Ashgate 2008); Antoine Vauchez, 
‘Communities of International Litigators’, in Cesare Romano, Karen J Alter and 
Yuval Shany (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (2014). 
6 Karen J Alter, ‘Who Are the "Masters of the Treaty"?: European Governments and 
the European Court of Justice’ (1998) 52 International Organization 121, 131; Laurence 
R Helfer and Karen Alter, ‘Legitimacy and Lawmaking: A Tale of Three 
International Courts ’ (2013) 14 Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 487; Karen J Alter, The 
European Court's Political Power : Selected Essays (OUP 2009). 
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(uncritical) acceptance of the case law;7 and the protracted passivity of 
national governments.8 From a legal point of view it has been suggested 
that the Court’s interpretive authority has been secured by formal 
reasoning 9  (tempered with majoritarian activism) 10  and step by step 
decision making (incrementalism).11 In these ways, the Court has cultivated 
the image of a politically neutral institution applying the law rather than 
political programs or policy agendas.12   
  
The majority of explanations address the question of how the Court’s 
jurisprudence has been received rather than particularities characteristic of 
it, and rarely scrutinise how societal concerns and constraints are 
transformed into the legal logic of the case law.13 There has been a notable 
lack of quantitative empirical studies endeavouring to systematically 
unpack the legal mechanisms that enable the Court to fit the law to the 
facts of individual cases without compromising the overall coherence and 
consistency of jurisprudence.14   
 
The present article engages in this type of empirical inquiry. Its central 
premise is that external constraints and judicial sensitivities are reflected in 
judicial outcomes and in judicial language. This is particularly evident in 
prefabricated judicial formulas and locutions which are used to project the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  Harm Schepel and Rein Wesseling, ‘The Legal Community: Judges, Lawyers, 
Officials and Clerks in the Writing of Europe’ (1997) 3 European Law Journal 165; 
Harm Schepel, ‘The European Brotherhood of Lawyers: The Reinvention of Legal 
Science in the Making of European Private Law’ (2007) 32 Law & Social Inquiry 183; J 
H H Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 The Yale Law Journal 2403; 
Antoine Vauchez, ‘The Transnational Politics of Judicialization. Van Gend En Loos 
and the Making of EU Polity’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal 1. 
8 Weiler (n 7) 2447 
9 ibid 2447, Miguel P Maduro, We, the Court : The European Court of Justice and the 
European Economic Constitution : A Critical Reading of Article 30 of the Ec Treaty (Hart 
1998), 10.  
10 Or more specifically, formalism on the level of judicial language was mitigated with 
underlying policy authority in the form of majoritarian approach to the review of 
state regulation. See  Maduro (n 9) 10. 
11 Trevor C Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law : An Introduction to the 
Constitutional and Administrative Law of the European Union (7th edn, OUP 2010) See 
also Helfer and Slaughter (n 1) 315 
12 Burley and Mattli (n 4) 69; Maduro (n 9) 11.  
13 See however a comprehensive analysis .of the case law in term of reasoning and 
outcomes in Maduro (n 9). 
14  For systematic qualitative empirical studies see for example Marc A Jacob, 
Precedents and Case-Based Reasoning in the European Court of Justice : Unfinished Business 
(CUP 2014); Mattias Derlén and Johan Lindholm, ‘Goodbye Van Gend En Loos, 
Hello Bosman? Using Network Analysis to Measure the Importance of Individual 
Cjeu Judgments’ (2014) 20 European Law Journal 667; Loïc Azoulai, ‘The ‘Retained 
Powers’ Formula in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice: EU Law as Total 
Law?’ (2011) 4 EJLS 192. 
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autonomy, neutrality, and universality of jurisprudence.15 The article’s case 
study is one of the most familiar formulations in European law, the so 
called argument of effet utile or the effectiveness of European law. The 
study unpacks the nature and the role of this term, and demonstrates that 
effet utile occurs in a specific area in a particular period and in particular 
argumentative contexts. Namely, it is revealed as having a distinct 
function: to balance the entrenchment and expansion of the fundamental 
doctrines of European judge-made law, primacy, direct effect and human 
rights. At times, this entails a full (or at least a partial) decoupling of 
principles from remedies or other tactics that effectively mitigate the 
effects of pronounced principles and doctrines either in individual cases or 
lines of cases. This is what scholars have described as incrementalism. 
Having examined the necessary empirical data concerning this, the current 
article argues that effet utile is a rhetorical instrument used to persuade 
Member States to accept judicial doctrines and the ensuing powers of the 
Court without having to compromise the coherence and continuity of law 
in the process.  
 
The development of effet utile is usually studied as a concept of EU law 
within the framework of the interpretative methods and legal principles 
developed by the Court. This article combines such in-depth legal analysis 
with “citation network analysis” and “classification of cases on the basis of 
language use”, and produces what is currently the most nuanced portrait of 
the Court’s decision making. By underpinning qualitative legal research 
and a close legal reading with quantitative empirical methods, this study 
yields more reliable results than a purely quantitative or a purely qualitative 
method. The analysis seeks to broaden the legal debate on methods of 
interpretation and legal development, and to add to a lively but largely 
theoretical debate on the subject of judicial law making by international 
courts.16 Its main contributions stem from creating a more comprehensive 
understanding of effet utile and a more detailed portrait of the long-term 
process of maintaining supranational judicial authority.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 On the latter point see Pierre   Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of 
the Juridical Field’ (1986-1987) 38 Hastings LJ 814, 820.  
16 The creative aspect of adjudication has long been underplayed in continental legal 
thought. However, in recent decades it has become widely accepted that 
international and supranational courts make law when they interpret legal text and 
that they have considerable influence on international legal development. For legal 
debate on the subject see Ingo Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law : 
On Semantic Change and Normative Twists (OUP 2012); Jacob; Joxerramon Bengoetxea, 
The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice : Towards a European Jurisprudence 
(OUP 1993); Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, ‘In Whose Name? An 
Investigation of International Courts’ Public Authority and Its Democratic 
Justification’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 7. 
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Section Two of this work delimits the research objective and outlines the 
empirical materials and the approach. Section Three presents the empirical 
properties of the effet utile case law. It identifies instances of the Court’s 
recourse to effet utile in the sample of historic case law,17 and contrasts 
them with the whole sample of historic case law, the effectiveness cases, 
and the entire dataset. Section Four discusses the distinct characteristics 
of the landmark effet utile cases and their influence on European law, and 
undertakes closer scrutiny of individual cases and groups of cases to 
interpret the findings qualitatively. Section Five provides a summary of the 
main arguments and presents the article’s conclusions.   
 
II. DELIMITING THE OBJECT OF INQUIRY 
 
1. Effet utile: A circle whose centre is everywhere and nowhere 
Like most international legal orders, the EU legal order has no centralised 
European enforcement mechanism. It must continually rely on national 
authorities to give it full effect. Within this framework, judicial constructs 
and formulas are expected to work like incantations which will trigger 
national compliance. Among the best known are the formulas of 
effectiveness of Treaty Articles and other provisions of European law, and 
the prohibition of unilateral measures that would damage the unity and 
efficacy of the common market.18 
 
Effet utile is a familiar term in national and international law.19 It has 
become central in European jurisprudence: a staple in the case law of the 
Court of Justice for five consecutive decades, and a sturdy, constant 
presence in volumes of legal scholarship. Broadly speaking it is possible to 
paint two diverging portraits of effet utile, contingent on the approach 
taken. While the first approach can be described as more conceptual or 
positivist, the second is more contextual and inspired by the legal realist 
tradition.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The Court uses the term “historic case law” (in French: jurisprudence historique) 
when it refers to the important pre-accession case law, which was identified, selected 
and assembled for the purposes of three successive enlargements and translated into 
the languages of accession countries. For a detailed description please see the 
following section and the Court’s website:   
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_14955/ (accessed 27 April 2015). 
18  The paper distinguishes between effet utile cases and cases which deal with 
effectiveness in the procedural sense: namely, principle of effectiveness and 
equivalence cases (Rewe/Comet formula). The latter category of cases is excluded.  
19 Scholars have traced the origin of useful effect back to Roman times. Anna von 
Oettingen, Effet Utile Und Individuelle Rechte Im Recht Der Europäischen Union (Nomos 
2010), 25. 
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A large proportion of scholarship is focused on the legal nature of effet utile 
and conceptualises it as a legal principle20  associated with the liberal 
statutory interpretation, either as a sub-category of dynamic interpretation 
(“the most usual functional criterion”)21 or as an independent method.22 
Thus defined, effet utile is afforded a distinct and distinctive role as “un outil 
indispensable”23 to the process of constructing the central doctrines of EU 
law such as direct effect, indirect effect, supremacy, and Member State 
liability in damages.24 In this framework of understanding, effet utile is 
deemed to have wide structural effects on the European legal space.25  
 
By contrast, a narrower segment of the scholarship analyses effet utile from 
a socio-legal and more critical angle. In these accounts, effet utile is an 
empty if not a misleading rhetoric employed by the Court to “justify” 
innovation and divergent outcomes without substantively engaging with 
the goals of integration and the arguments of the parties.26 This line of 
reasoning culminates in the definition of effet utile as a facade for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Effet utile is often associated with the “liberal interpretation” of the Treaty.  Takis 
Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2006), 419. The same holds 
for German speaking scholarship. (See the literature cited in Oettingen (n 19). See 
also Michael Potacs, ‘Effet Utile Als Auslegungsgrundsatz’ (2009)  EuR). Recent 
literature broadens the legal context of effet utile considerably, discussing it against 
other principles of European law such as loyalty. For instance, Marcus Klamert, The 
Principle of Loyalty in EU Law (OUP 2014). Other scholars have focused on the 
context of justification and argumentation, for example Mitchel Lasser, Judicial 
Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy (OUP 
2009) See also Jacob (n 14) 25. Nevertheless, scholarship continues to treat effet utile 
as an interpretive instrument (Klamert (n 20) 255.) either in the form of an emerging 
constitutional principle (Malcolm Ross, ‘Effectiveness in the European Legal 
Order(S): Beyond Supremacy to Constitutional Proportionality? ’ (2006) 31 EL Rev 
476); a meta rule of interpretation (Stefan Mayr, ‘Putting a Leash on the Court of 
Justice? Preconceptions in National Methodology V Effet Utile as a Meta-Rule’ 
(2012/13) 5 European Journal of Legal Studies 8 ); or a meta-policy of the Advocates 
General and the CJEU (Lasser (n 20) 212). 
21 Bengoetxea (n 16) 254.  
22 Sibylle Seyr, Der Effet Utile in Der Rechtsprechung Des Eugh (Duncker & Humblot 
2008), 367.  
23 José Luís da Cruz Vilaça, ‘Le Principe De L’effet Utile Du Droit De L’union Dans 
La Jurisprudence De La Cour’ in Allan Rosas, Egils Levits and Yves Bot (eds), The 
Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe : Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of 
Case-Law (Asser Press & Springer 2012) See also Tridimas (n 20). 
24 See for instance Paul Craig, ‘The ECJ and Ultra Vires Action: A Conceptual 
Analysis’ (2011) 48 CMLR, 400.  
25 Effet utile is seen as the principle which more than any other structured this 
relationship and the European legal space more generally. Armin von Bogdandy and 
Michael Ioannidis, ‘Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law: What It Is, What Has 
Been Done, What Can Be Done' Common Market Law Review’ (2014) 51 Common 
Market Law Review 59, 64. 
26 Lasser (n 20) 236; Gerard Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European 
Court of Justice (CUP 2012) 117.  
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potentially unbridled policymaking under the guise of interpretation.27 
Contrary to this, the present inquiry treats effet utile as a routine linguistic 
formulation in the case law of the Court rather than a rhetorical disguise 
or a legal principle. Its nature and role are explored in relation to the chain 
of argumentation (argumentative context) in which it is embedded and in 
relation to case outcomes.   
 
2. Materials and Approach 
When the new Member States acceded to the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013 
it was decided that selected, important pre-accession case-law (referred to 
as the historic case law) of the Court had to be translated into the 
languages of acceding Member States. The case law initially selected for 
the 2004 accession countries consisted of 948 judgments, opinions, and 
orders of the Court and the Court of First Instance (now General Court), 
dating from 1956 to April 2004. However, only 57 cases (50 decided by the 
Court and 7 by the General Court) were translated at the Commission's 
expense. The same exercise was repeated in 2007 with subsequent 
accessions of Bulgaria and Romania, and in 2013 when Croatia joined the 
EU. This assemblage of 50 cases of the Court, it has been argued, is a 
tribute to the judicial construction of the European legal order.28  
 
Such a selection might offer a near perfect platform for examining the 
tools and techniques that enabled the Court to construct the European 
legal order were it not for the Court’s irregular and imprecise use of 
language and terminology. It is not possible to successfully use the 
standard automated search techniques employed to identify all instances 
where a term occurs and compile a complete sample, to arrive at a clear 
delimitation of the object of inquiry.29 Multilingualism, often cited as the 
usual culprit when it comes to European terminology and concepts,30 is not 
to blame. In French alone, the Court has referred to plein effet,31 pleine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Hjalte Rasmussen, The European Court of Justice (Gadjura 1998); Hartley (n11) 74. 
28 Urska Sadl and Mikael R Madsen, ‘Becoming European (Legally): Unpacking the 
Self-Portrait of the Eu Legal Order in the Pre-Accession Case-Law Dossiers’ (Annual 
Conference of the Empirical Legal Studies (CELS), Berkeley November 2014).  
29 For instance, EurLex and Curia do not find all the usages of a term, providing an 
incomplete and biased sample that can best be analysed qualitatively. 
30 Elina Paunio and Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo, ‘Taking Language Seriously: An 
Analysis of Linguistic Reasoning and Its Implications in EU Law’ (2010) 16 European 
Law Journal 395; Mattias Derlén, ‘Multilingual Interpretation of CJEU Case Law: 
Rule and Reality ’ (2014) 39 European Law Review 295 
31 Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm and others v Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1, para 4: “[i]f the 
ultimate general aim of the Treaty is to be respected, this parallel application of the 
national system can only be allowed in so far as it does not prejudice the uniform 
application throughout the common market of the Community rules on cartels and 
of the full effect [plein effet] of the measures adopted in implementation of those 
rules. Any other solution would be incompatible with the objectives of the Treaty 
and the character of its rules on competition.” 
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effectivité, la pleine application, or simply efficacité 32  while in English 
translations and linguistic versions the Court has used full effect, effet utile 
(in brackets after the English translation, or left untranslated), 
effectiveness, efficacy, practical effect and full effectiveness, often 
interchangeably.33  
 
Consequently, the selected historic case law examined in this article is first 
explored by looking for the following word combinations: effectiveness, 
practical effect, full effect, efficacy, effet utile, plein effet, efficacité, and pleine 
application in the full text of the judgments in English and French language 
versions. These instances are then recorded systematically. 
 
Cases in which any of these formulations occur at least once are treated as 
“historic effet utile cases.” Their empirical properties such as their subject 
matter, reporting judges, Advocates Generals, the principles that they 
established, and their “importance scores” are then recorded and compared 
to the selected historic case law (fifty cases), to the full network consisting 
of 9500 judgments of the Court, and to the larger effectiveness dataset 
consisting of all judgments of the Court in which effet utile, effectiveness or 
plein effet appear in the text or the title of the document (1707 cases).34  
 
The “importance score” is assigned to cases on the basis of quantitative 
and qualitative criteria. In terms of the former, the article draws upon 
political science literature which uses Jon Kleinberg’s hub and authority 
scores 35  and adapts the method used in social and academic citation 
network analysis to study the structure of the case law of courts.36 By way 
of comparison: in academic citation networks, the importance (centrality) 
of a scientific paper depends both on the number of citations it receives 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727. 
33 A good example is the Court’s judgment in Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle 
Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629. 
34 The database is created by iCourts as a part of the project on international courts. 
http://jura.ku.dk/icourts/  
35 Hub and authority scores are calculated for each case by modelling the network 
with the adjacency matrix A of the network graph. The vectors x and y, representing 
all hub and authority scores in the network, can be computed as x = ATy and y = Ax, 
AT being the transpose of A. Kleinberg was able to show that after a number of 
iterations, vectors x and y converge to x* and y* the principal eigenvectors of ATA 
and AAT, respectively. In less technical terms, hubs and authorities result from a 
mutually reinforcing citation setting which takes into account the number and the 
importance of citations. A good hub is one that points to many good authorities; a 
good authority is one that is pointed to by many good hubs. Jon M Kleinberg, 
‘Authoritative Sources in a Hyperlinked Environment’ (1999) Journal of the ACM 
(JACM) 465, 604.   
36 For the first study of citation to case law see James H Fowler and others, ‘Network 
Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal Importance of Supreme Court 
Precedents’ (2007) 15 Political Analysis. 
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and on the importance of subsequent scientific papers which cite it. 
Similarly, the centrality of the individual case in the case citation network 
depends on the number and the centrality of subsequent cases that directly 
refer to it. Thus, in this methodology it is important to be cited; but it is 
more important still to be cited in important papers and cases. 
 
The article re-works this method further to study how the influence of 
individual cases varied over a longer period of time, from the mid-1950s to 
2013. To this end, citation graphs are constructed for each year from 1954 
onwards and centrality scores for each graph are computed. 37  The 
qualitative criteria for assigning importance to cases are based on scholarly 
commentary (which sometimes refers to several of them as the “classics of 
EU law”)38 and on a legal analysis of the principles which they established, 
expanded or reaffirmed. 
 
III. EMPIRICAL PROPERTIES OF EFFET UTILE CASE LAW 
 
This section identifies and examines the main empirical properties of the 
historic effet utile cases in a systematic manner. The first sub-section looks 
at the general properties of the empirical materials using descriptive 
statistics, the second sub-section reviews and systematises the materials on 
the basis of their content, and the third sub-section studies their citation 
patterns and the network structure using the tools of citation network 
analysis. 
 
1. Quantitative Properties of Historic Effet Utile Cases 
Of the 50 cases in the pre-accession package, 21 cases can be categorised as 
“historic effet utile cases” on the basis that they contain an express 
reference to either effet utile (9 cases), efficacité (6 cases), plein effet (1 case), 
pleine efficacité (4 cases) and pleine application (1 case) in the French language 
version. Three cases refer to two or three of these expressions 
interchangeably.39  
 
As a group, the historic effet utile cases have some general properties which 
must be noted at the outset. Regarding timeframe, one case was decided in 
the 1960s, seven cases were decided during the 1970s, eight during the 
1980s, and five in early to mid-1990s. Hence, they are fairly evenly 
distributed between 1970s and 1990s. In terms of subject matter, 
according to the Court’s classification most historic effet utile cases are 
related to the internal market. In particular, they relate to the free 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 This yields the charts of so-called initial authority and hub scores of 50 cases in the 
network, indicating the relative significance of individual cases over a more than half 
a century. 
38 Miguel Poiares Maduro and Loïc Azoulai, The Past and Future of EU Law : The 
Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart 2010). 
39 For instance Simmenthal (n 33). 
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movement of workers and freedom of establishment, to social provisions, 
and to competition, as shown in Figure 1. By comparison, the largest 
proportion of cases in the pre-accession package, also presented in Figure 
1, concerns the freedom of movement of goods (FOG, 20.41%), followed 
by common agricultural policy (CAP, 10.20%), competition law (COMP, 
14.29%), European institutions (EU INSTIT, 10.20%) and social policy 
(SP, 10.20%).40 
	  
Figure 1: Subject matter (in percentages) of effet utile cases compared to historic case law of 
the Court, the effectiveness cases and all cases decided by the Court from 1954 - 2013 
Lastly, historic effet utile cases were reported by 14 different reporting 
judges and accompanied by the opinions of 15 Advocates General. Thus, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 By comparison, in the full dataset (9581 judgments) the freedom of services and 
establishment (FOS/E) and common agricultural policy (CAP) are on the top of the 
list accounting for 24.19% and 14.26% of all cases, followed by approximation of laws 
(Approx, 9.37%) and the free movement of goods (FOG, 9.94%), as well as 
competition law (Comp) with 7.66%. Staff Regulation cases (Staff Reg), meaning the 
disputes initiated by the employees of EU institutions against their employers, 
including courts, make up 7.64% of case law and so on. 
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the Court’s use of the term seems unrelated to the specific reporting or 
sitting judges or the Advocates General. 
2. Categories of Historic Effet Utile Cases Based on Qualitative Criteria  
Historic effet utile cases can be further systematised  according to four 
qualitative criteria: (1) the scope of protection (the level of generality); (2) 
the object to which the Court’s argument of effet utile is directed (namely, 
the interest it aims to protect); (3) the Court’s “law-making” initiative and 
its practical effects (establishment of new judge-made principles and 
judicial consequences); (4) the argumentative context in which the term 
effet utile occurs.   
 
The basis for the first classification (the scope of protection, or the level of 
generality) is the texts of individual judgments alone. The Court can either 
invoke the effet utile of the Treaty as a whole (Reyners41), or of European law 
(Hauer,42 Factortame43), or of a specific policy area (effet utile of competition 
rules as in Van Eycke44), or of a specific Treaty article (former Article 48 
EC in Bosman45). Most historic effet utile cases (13 out of 21) invoke the 
useful effect of Community law or norms/acts of Community law in 
general, while 5 invoke the effectiveness of a certain policy area, and 3 
invoke the useful effect of a specific Treaty Article.  
 
The basis for the second classification (the interest that the Court aims to 
protect) is not exclusively the text of the judgment but also other 
qualitative criteria such as the language of the Court, the subject matter 
assigned to the case by the Court, the keywords that accompany each 
judgment, and the case-law directory in which the case is placed. 
Concerning the object or aim of protection, effet utile arguments can be 
addressed to the (proper) functioning of the internal market (for instance 
Albany46), the general principles of the legal order (Hoechst47), the authority 
of EU law (Simmenthal48), or the protection of the individual (Becker,49 Von 
Colson,50 or Johnston51). Out of 21 effet utile cases there are 10 cases whose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Case 2/74 Jean Reyners v Belgian State [1974] ECR 00631. 
42 Case 44/79 Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 03727. 
43 Case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and 
others [1990] ECR I-02433. 
44 Case 267/86 Pascal Van Eycke v ASPA NV [1988] ECR 4769. 
45 Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association v Jean-Marc Bosman 
[1995] ECR I-04921. 
46 Case C-67/96 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie 
[1999] ECR I-05751. 
47 Joined cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst AG v Commission [1989] ECR 2859. 
48 Simmenthal (n 33). 
49 Case 8/81 Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53. 
50 Case 14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] 
ECR 1891. 
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main object of protection is the individual (there are 16 cases in the 
historic case law in this category), 1 case that deals with the authority of 
EU law (out of 8 cases in the historic case law), 4 cases that address the 
general principles of the legal order (out of 9 cases in the historic case law 
that can be classified as such), and 6 effet utile cases that concern the 
functioning of the internal market (out of 15 included in the historic case 
law).  
 
The third classification (the law making initiative) takes into account the 
same factors as the second classification, as well as scholarly commentary 
or notes de doctrine (case comments) discussing individual cases as judicial 
contributions to the acquis. The vast majority of cases in which the Court 
relied on effet utile establish principles or rules that can be labelled as judge-
made law (16 out of 21), a finding that holds for the majority of the pre-
accession cases included in the package. In 18 out of 21 historic effet utile 
cases there are features with additional pertinence for this study. 
Frequently, the abstract rule or principle are disconnected from their 
effects (14 cases). Less often, effet utile appears together with a reference to 
the fundamental principles of the EU and common traditions (4 cases). In 
the aforementioned ‘disconnected’ group (14 cases), the Court delayed the 
effect of the principle in 4 cases and also partly or fully decoupled the 
principle from the remedy. In the rest of historic case law (29 cases) the 
Court limited the effects of the judgment only once.52 The 3 historic effet 
utile cases where none of the above occurs are Cassis de Dijon,53 Factortame 
and Becker. Cassis de Dijon is a marginal case by this study’s criteria because 
the reference to effectiveness occurs in the context of effective fiscal 
supervision as a justified impediment to the internal market. Factortame 
and Becker are not marginal in this way. Both concerned the enforcement 
of directly effective rights of individuals, and the Court ruled that national 
courts had to protect those rights by granting a remedy, either by interim 
relief (Factortame, decided in 1990) or by directly applying EU law in cases 
where the Member State did not take the necessary measures to transpose 
the Directive (Becker, decided in 1982).   
 
The fourth classification is based on the same criteria as the second 
classification along with a close reading of historic effet utile cases. The 
Court used the argument of effet utile initially in the argumentative context 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Case 222/84 Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
[1986] ECR 1651. 
52 In Case 45/86 Commission v Council [1987] ECR 01493 concerning the legal basis for 
Community measures; the Court annulled the regulation in question but considered 
that for reasons of legal certainty its effects were to be declared definitive pursuant 
to Article 264 TFEU (then Article 174 EEC). As opposed to other historic effect 
utile cases, this mitigation of consequences was envisaged by the Treaty. 
53 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de 
Dijon)[1979] ECR 649. 
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of direct effect: to extend it, clarify it, or to adapt it to triangular 
situations. Subsequently, the Court grounded its reasoning in Simmenthal in 
the language of effectiveness to entrench primacy and link its rationale to 
the rationale of direct effect (Van Duyn,54 Hauer, Reyners, Commission v 
Belgium55). Lastly, the Court justified the establishment of new principles 
using effet utile (Johnston, Francovich 56 ), reinforced already established 
principles (Hauer), or did both (Brasserie,57 Factortame).   
 
3. Empirical Properties of Historic Effet Utile Cases Based on Citation Network 
Analysis 
The above findings can be further refined using the tools of network 
analysis. The results indicate that as a group historic effet utile cases are 
more authoritative than other groups of cases. The average authority score 
of all 21 effet utile cases is 1.45 times higher than the average authority score 
of the selected pre-accession case law, 5.5 times higher than the average 
authority score of effectiveness cases, and ten times higher than the 
average authority score of all cases in the network. 58 The average hub score 
of historic effet utile cases is equivalent to the average hub score of all cases 
in the network.59 This means that as a group, historic effet utile cases had a 
comparatively higher impact on EU law.  
 
In order to illustrate which individual historic effet utile cases were the 
most influential (and in which specific periods) initial authority scores can 
be calculated for each case in the group. The initial authority scores chart 
in Figure 2 presents the relative salience of selected individual historic effet 
utile cases over a time span of 50 years.60 We can observe that two cases in 
particular, Simmenthal and Defrenne,61 decided in 1978 and 1976, stand out as 
most authoritative. The fluctuations in their citation scores indicate that 
they had an uneven impact on the law over time, and the surge in initial 
authority scores in the early-eighties followed by another surge in the mid-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Case 41/74 Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 01337, paragraph 12. 
55 Case 149/79 Commission v Belgium (interim judgment) [1980] ECR 3881. 
56 Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Andrea Francovich and others v Italy [1991] ECR I-
05357. 
57 Joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR I-
01029. 
58 For the definition and the method of calculation of hub and authority scores see (n 
35). 
59 The averages of authority and scores of the groups of cases are based on the 
calculations of hub and authority scores using HITS algorithm. 
60 The initial authority scores for every case represented in Figure 3 are calculated 
from the date when the case was decided until 2013 when the last acceding nation 
became a full member of the EU. We take a snapshot of the network for every year 
and compute the initial hub and authority scores. We then extract the initial 
authority scores of the selected cases which are represented in the Figure. 
61 Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 00455. 
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eighties means that they had the most impact on the case law in those 
periods.  
 
Figure 2: The chart of initial authority scores of selected influential historic effet utile cases 
 
Below, Figure 3 represents a network of cases which are directly or 
indirectly linked to Defrenne and Simmenthal. Namely, a network 
encompassing cases which explicitly refer to either of these judgements, or 
cases linked by citation to earlier direct references to them.62 The network 
structure attests to the far-reaching impact of Defrenne and Simmenthal, 
especially on the law of remedies and the protection of the individual. 
Figure 3 also shows the proximity of Defrenne and Simmenthal to Van Gend63 
and Costa v ENEL,64 which further confirms the link between historic effet 
utile cases and the cases which proclaim the distinctiveness of the legal 
order and its authority.  
 
In fact, as demonstrated in Figure 4, Van Gend,65 Defrenne and Simmenthal 
have nearly identical citation patterns. Moreover, the peaks in their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 The network in Figure 3 is a sub-network of the full network, whereby the latter 
consists of all judgments of the Court. The sub-network in Figure 3 is built by 
extracting a smaller segment from the full network, concretely the Simmenthal and 
the Defrenne cases and their inward and outward citations using Gephi software 
(union of ego networks, depth 1). It is composed of all cases that Simmenhtal and/or 
Defrenne cite, and the cases which cite Simmethal and/or Defrenne, and cases that are 
directly connected to the latter cases with a citation.  
63 Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 
1. 
64 Case 6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 585. 
65 Van Gend was not cited much until the late-seventies and the early-eighties. This is 
partly due to the Court’s practice of not referring to case law directly which changed 
in the late-seventies. However, other historic cases decided in the same period have 
higher citation scores (notably Reyners, Case 8-74 Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave 
Dassonville [1974] ECR 83, and Joined cases 56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig [1966] 
ECR0299). 
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authority scores correspond to a period of integration that has been 
characterised as constitutional mutation in the form of expansion of 
Community jurisdiction and the de facto disappearance of the principle of 
enumerated powers.66  
 
 
 
Figure 3: The sub-network of Defrenne and Simmenthal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Weiler (n 7) 2435. 
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Figure 4: The initial authority scores of selected historic case law 
By contrast, Defrenne and Simmenthal have a shorter incubation period 
compared to Van Gend and Costa v ENEL, and to similar cases in the 
historic case law package such as ERTA 67  or Les Verts 68  which are 
considered to be of fundamental importance to EU law. On average, 
historic cases peak about 10 years after they are handed down. These 
findings strongly suggest that the full effect of direct effect and primacy 
was delayed.  
 
To sum up, the findings of this empirical analysis suggest that effet utile cases 
have three distinct characteristics. First, they are more authoritative. Second, 
their impact on the case law is considerable but uneven in terms of the object 
of protection and with regard to the time period. Third, they are 
characterised by selective application of the principles that they proclaim. In 
the following section these characteristics will be explored in greater detail.  
 
IV. THE ARGUMENT OF EFFET UTILE IN HISTORIC EFFET UTILE 
CASES: A LEGAL ANALYSIS  
 
The argument of effet utile first appeared in 1961 in the Steenkolenmijnen 
Limburg69 case alongside the so-called retained powers formula (one of the 
most frequently used and well-known formulas of European law).70 The 
Court used it to balance the Community of Six’s interest in healthy 
competition against Germany’s interest in giving bonuses to workers 
which created a competitive advantage for German companies that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Case 22/70 Commission v Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263. 
68 Case 294/83 Parti écologiste "Les Verts" v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339. 
69 Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority [1961] ECR 1. 
70 Azoulai (n 14) 192. 
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distorted competition. The problem was how to establish authority in the 
fields related to competition such as the social security and labour market 
to which the German bonuses were related. The Court stressed that the 
Community could impinge on national sovereignty (directly translated 
from the French: permit the incursions of Community competence) only 
in order to ensure that the effet utile of the Treaty was not considerably 
weakened and its aims and purposes were not seriously compromised.  
 
The Court did not use the classical formulation of effet utile in Van Gend and 
Costa v ENEL, but referred to the executive force of Community law (Costa v 
ENEL), the effectiveness of public enforcement procedures (Van Gend), and 
to the vigilance of the individuals whose rights were at stake to effectively 
enforce European law (Van Gend). This may have been due to the fact that the 
term had hitherto only been used to negotiate the division of competences 
and not to refer to a special character of European law; or it may have been an 
indication that the Court felt encouraged by the strong support of FIDE and 
the Commission which rendered legal diplomacy unnecessary.71 
 
In historic effet utile cases, the reasoning of Steenkolenmijnen is reinforced by 
creating links to either the rationale of Van Gend (the protection of the 
individual) or Costa v ENEL (the autonomous legal system which prohibits 
subsequent unilateral measures). However, as will be demonstrated, the 
concrete consequences of the judicial extensions of doctrines are rarely 
severe for the Member States involved. The following sub-sections present 
three distinct uses of the argument of effet utile by the Court in more 
detail: (1) the decoupling of the legal principle from the concrete remedy 
which is the most pervasive use; (2) the repeated appeal to fundamental 
legal principles of EU law; and (3) the evocation of common goals and unity 
in prefabricated formulas and locutions.  
 
1. Principle and Practice  
In several historic effet utile cases the Court completely or partially 
detached the practical effects of the judgments from the declared legal 
principles and newly established abstract concepts. In other cases, the 
consequences of particular decisions in terms of remedies for the 
applicants affected the concerned Member State only marginally.   
 
In Van Duyn (1974) the Court used effet utile to extend direct effect to 
directives. In the concrete case in question, this also implied that in 
principle the Member States lost the ultimate authority for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 See Vauchez, ‘The Transnational Politics of Judicialization. Van Gend En Loos and 
the Making of EU Polity’ See also Morten Rasmussen, ‘From Costa V. Enel to the 
Treaties of Rome – a Brief History of a Legal Revolution’, in Luís Miguel P Maduro 
and Loïc Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of EU Law : The Classics of EU Law Revisited 
on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart 2010). 
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interpretation of the concept of public policy (which was to become 
subject to control by the institutions of the Community, notably the 
Court). Nevertheless, the Court conceded that under “particular 
circumstances” the competent national authorities should be granted 
discretion.72 This effectively decoupled the newly extended doctrine of 
direct effect of directives and the proclamation of authority of the Court 
from the remedy in the concrete case. The UK could effectively refuse 
entry to Ms Van Duyn for being a member of the church of scientology. 
 
Reyners (1974) relaxed the conditions for direct effect in the area of 
freedom of establishment. Following this case, Treaty articles that 
required implementing measures could in principle have direct effect 
contrary to what was a clear requirement of the condition of 
unconditionality for direct effect which was set in Van Gend. The ruling 
seems bold, encroaching upon the freedom of the Member States to draw 
up a list of professions reserved for their nationals. Yet, while the applicant 
in the national court may have been a Dutch national, he was also a Belgian 
lawyer (a native Dutch speaker with a Belgian law degree; hardly a 
foreigner). While the principle was demanding, the remedy was not. 
 
In both cases the Court renegotiated the executive force of Community 
law in terms of effet utile, and reiterated the argument from Costa v ENEL 
(“to avoid the effectiveness of the Treaty being defeated by unilateral 
provisions of Member States”73). According to the Court, the “Community 
character of the limits imposed”74 by the EU on permissible exceptions to 
the principle of freedom of establishment and the free movement of 
workers prevented the Member States from unilaterally and individually 
drawing up a list of professions reserved for their own nationals (Reyners), 
or unilaterally defining public policy (Van Duyn). The move was rhetorical 
in Reyners, but practical in Van Duyn. Both cases were decided in 1974. 
Interestingly, the Court did not extend its reasoning in Reyners to the free 
movement of workers in a subsequent case that involved professions 
connected to the exercise of State authority in Commission v Belgium.  
In Commission v Belgium (1980) the Court’s central argument was closer to 
its reasoning in Hauer and in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft.75 The Court 
reiterated the formulation of the unity and efficacy of Community law to 
balance the legitimate interests of individual Member States with a 
common interest in ensuring the effectiveness of the Treaty and the 
equality of treatment of all nationals of all Member States. Concretely, it 
held that as a matter of principle domestic laws of individual Member 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Van Duyn, para 18. 
73 Reyners, para 50. 
74 Reyners, para 50. 
75 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für 
Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125. 
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States could serve as a basis for the interpretation of the Community 
concept of public service. Nonetheless, the Court decoupled the principle 
from the remedy and softened the expansion of the autonomous legal 
order in practice.76 It issued an interim judgment requesting that the 
Commission and the Member States draft a list of professions that would 
be reserved for nationals. The Court only delivered the final ruling two 
years later, after an extension of the deadline prompted by the 
disagreements between the Commission and the Member States 
participating in the negotiations.77  
 
In Defrenne (1976) the separation of the principle from the remedy is very 
evident, both linguistically and in terms of its effects in practice. The 
Court extended direct effect to private disputes (the so called horizontal 
direct effect) via effectiveness, which required a considerable re-balancing 
of the social and the economic objectives of the common market (in favour 
of the former)78 as well as of the Court’s authority to attribute different 
weight to these principles. The establishment of the principle (and the 
Court’s authority to re-interpret common market objectives) was 
mitigated by a temporal limitation of the effects of the judgment based on 
the considerations of legal certainty and the importance of “affected 
interests.”79 This reconciliatory gesture from the Court in Defrenne did not 
escape criticism. While some gave the Court credit for accepting “the 
responsibility to mould constitutional doctrine in order to make more 
acceptable the practical effects of judicial decisions”80 others found this 
type of “amnesty” unacceptable.81 Additionally, the Court did not address 
the entire spectrum of situations that could/would lead to discrimination, 
but only addressed direct and overt discrimination which could be 
determined by “legal means.”82 This narrowed the potential application of 
the judgment to a greater extent.  
 
In Von Colson (1984) the Court established the doctrine of so-called 
indirect effect, sometimes referred to as the principle of conform 
interpretation.83 It relied on the useful effect of directives to stress the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Commission v Belgium, paras 23 and 24.  
77 Case 149/79 Commission v Belgium (final judgment of the Court of 26 May 1982) 
[1982] ECR 1845. 
78 Defrenne (n 61) para 10. 
79 ibid, para 74. 
80 Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice : A Comparative 
Study in Judicial Policymaking (Nijhoff 1986), 438 and seq. 
81 A comment by Christian Philip (1976) Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 529. 
82 Defrenne (n 61) para 18. 
83 On the principle of conform interpretation as a method for finding compatibility 
between legal norms belonging to different but coordinated systems, or for finding 
coherence within the system, see Joxerramon Bengoetxea, ‘Conform Interpretation 
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obligation of national courts to provide effective remedy in cases involving 
gender discrimination. The Court did not consider purely nominal 
compensation such as reimbursement of the expenses incurred in 
connection with the application as adequate, effective and deterrent, but 
stopped short of imposing a particular sanction and gave national courts 
considerable discretion. Even if in principle the national courts were to 
interpret all national law in the light of EU law, in a concrete case a 
national court could implement the newly established principle by 
deciding the case in accordance with - ultimately - national law.  
 
In CIA Security (1994)84 the Court was called to rule on the question of 
whether directives could have effect on third parties: the so called incidental 
effect of directives. It recognised that a Member State breach of the 
obligation to notify the Commission regarding technical standards could 
affect the rights of private parties in private disputes and impact upon the 
greater effectiveness of Community control over internal market regulation 
and compliance. However, it held that in the concrete case in question a 
provision such as Article 4 of the 1990 Belgian Law which provided that no 
one may run a security firm without approval from the Home Affairs 
Ministry was judged compatible with Article 30 of the Treaty. 
 
In Bosman (1995), which has been the Court’s most intensively cited 
judgment, the Court dampened its ruling against the obstacles to free 
movement imposed by football associations by temporarily limiting the 
resultant economic consequences, namely the payments of the transfer fees. 
By contrast, the Court refused to limit the effects of the judgment related to 
the nationality clauses which stemmed from its previous rulings.85   
 
2. The Foundations of the Community and its Fundamental Principles 
As noted, the Court has used effet utile to extend the doctrine of primacy 
(Costa v ENEL) by referring to the foundations of the Community (doing 
so more prominently still in Simmenthal). A shared concern resonates here: 
if (directly applicable) Community law were not to take precedence over 
national law, the foundations of the Community would be at stake. The 
similarity is most evident in the French language versions of the 
judgements where the Court uses the same expression, namely the (legal) 
basis of the Community. In Simmenthal, to recognise any legal effect of 
posterior national measures would amount to the denial of effectiveness of 
the obligations of the Member States which “mettrait ainsi en question les 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
as a Method for Balancing Autonomy and Heteronomy: Introduction’ Oñati Socio-
Legal Series via http://opo.iisj.net/index.php/osls/index (accessed 18 April 2015). 
84 Case C-194/94 CIA Security International SA v Signalson SA and Securitel SPRL [1996] 
ECR I-2201. 
85 Bosman, para 145. 
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bases mêmes de la Communauté”86 (Simmenthal, paragraph 18). In Costa, the 
reading is that domestic provisions which could override Community law 
would “mise en cause la base juridique de la Communauté elle-même”87 (Costa v 
ENEL, paragraph 3, third indent).  
 
The extension of primacy in Simmenthal came at the expense of the 
competence of national constitutional courts to police the coherence of 
national legal orders. To compensate for the loss of authority, as a matter 
of principle the Court granted the Italian Constitutional Court a de facto 
authority to rule on the compatibility of national measures with the 
national constitution. The Italian Constitutional Court had previously set 
aside the Italian measures deemed incompatible with European law,88 
making the ruling of the Court of Justice declaratory.  
 
As Figure 3 illustrates, Simmenthal is directly linked to the liability of the 
Member States for breaches of European law (Francovich and Brasserie), as 
well as to the area of judicial remedies and judicial review (Factortame and 
Johnston). It is well-documented that these doctrines are based directly on 
the effectiveness of the legal order and the ensuing obligations of the 
Member States. They impinge on the autonomy of the Member States to 
use national remedies and procedures. Figure 3 highlights the manner in 
which both are linked to the liability of Community institutions 
(Zuckerfabrik89) and individuals (Courage90).  
 
Francovich established the principle of Member State liability, but initially 
only in cases where directives lacked direct effect. According to the Court, 
the existence and scope of liability “must be considered in the light of the 
general system of the Treaty and its fundamental principles,” including 
direct applicability, primacy and the duty of national courts to protect 
individual rights,91 which until Francovich did not include the granting of 
EU remedy in the form of damages against a Member State. The Court 
relied primarily on effectiveness to stretch the reach of EU law in 
protecting individual rights. At the same time, the Court granted a certain 
leeway to the Member States in terms of procedural effectiveness, 
invoking the Rewe/Comet92 formula of procedural autonomy.93 The case 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 This is translated as “without the legal basis of the Community itself being called 
into question”.   
87 Translated as “would thus imperil the very foundations”. 
88 Simmenthal, paras 8 and 9 (n 33). 
89 Case 5-71 Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council [1971] ECR 975. 
90 Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and 
Others [2001] ECR I-06297. 
91 Francovich (n 56), para 30. 
92 Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für 
das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989 and Case 45/76 Comet BV v Produktschap voor 
Siergewassen [1976] ECR 2043. 
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seemed initially to evince strong rhetorical and doctrinal positions. 
However, in practice Francovich was the sequel of a lengthy dispute 
between Italy and the Commission, and followed Italy’s “previous 
conviction” by the Court in 1989 for not implementing the directive at 
stake.94 In a subsequent ruling the Court accepted Italy’s interpretation of 
Directive 80/987/EEC, limiting compensation according to national law 
and regulations pertaining to insolvency procedures. The compensation to 
the plaintiffs was ultimately denied.95  
 
In Brasserie du Pecheur96 the Court extended the Francovich liability to the 
legislative branch. It relied on Francovich, paragraph 33 to stress the adverse 
effects of the breaches of Community law on its full effectiveness. 
According to the Court, this also held true in cases of directly effective 
provisions of Community law. In fact, it was deemed “even more so” in 
those cases, since damages were a “necessary corollary of the direct effect.” 
In Francovich, paragraph 34, however, the Court held that the possibility to 
claim damages was “particularly indispensable where […] the full effectiveness of 
Community rules is subject to prior action on the part of the State and where, 
consequently, in the absence of such action, individuals cannot enforce before the 
national courts the rights conferred upon them by Community law.”97 Again, the 
effectiveness argument of Francovich, which justified damages in the 
absence of direct effect, was extended to cases where Community 
provisions were directly effective, whereby the formulation remained 
basically unchanged. In both instances, the a fortiori argument was 
employed to underpin the Court’s line of effectiveness reasoning. 
 
In Brasserie, the extension of Member State liability was counter-balanced 
by the Court’s conciliatory provisions. First, the Court stressed that it 
would take into account the “accepted methods of interpretation, in 
particular the fundamental principles of the Community legal system.”98 
Second, the Court relied on the importance of uniform application for the 
Community legal order,99 an instrument discussed in the next sub-section. 
Although the Court did not effectively detach the remedy (the potential 
payment of damages) from the principle, it relaxed the link between them 
by counterpoising rather concrete common guidelines for reparation with 
allowances for the Member States to apply the principle of Member State 
liability within their own statutory framework.100  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Francovich (n 56), paras 42 and 43. 
94 Case 22/87 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 143. 
95 Case C-479/93 Francovich v Italy [1995] ECR I-03843. 
96 Brasserie (n 57). 
97 Francovich (n 61) para 34. 
98 Brasserie (n 57) para 27. 
99 ibid, para 33. 
100 ibid, paras 83 and 90. 
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3. Common Interests and the Unity of EU Law 
Historic effet utile cases gradually link the primacy reasoning of Costa v 
ENEL to the rationale of unity and efficacy of EU law. The cases that 
concern the development of human rights protection situate a new field’s 
burgeoning power and influence in an appeal to the common interest and 
common goals. This is particularly evident in the link between the 
rationale of the protection of fundamental rights and the rationale to 
accord primacy to EU law, illustrated below.101  
 
In Hauer, the Court did not invent a common standard for human rights 
protection, but rather reaffirmed that the Community standard, 
articulated in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (1970), was autonomous.102 In 
order to attenuate the entrenchment of the autonomous standard of 
protection, the Court referred to the common constitutional traditions of 
the Member States and to the Convention as factors which were already 
binding all Member States before the Court’s ruling.  
 
The reference to the constitutional traditions of the Member States as 
indirect sources of European human rights protection in Hauer is taken 
from Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, while the reference to the 
international treaties (in particular the ECHR) is taken from Nold (1974).103 
Both are used to support the argument that a common (unified) system of 
protection is justified because the protection of human rights is a common 
goal of all Member States.104   
 
The Court’s rationale in Hauer is closely related to its rationale in Costa v 
ENEL. In Hauer, paragraph 14, the Court reasoned that the question of a 
possible infringement of fundamental rights by Community institutions 
could only be judged in the light of Community law, namely by the Court. 
The introduction of special criteria stemming from the legislation or 
constitutional law of a particular Member State would, by damaging the 
substantive unity and efficacy of Community law, lead inevitably to the 
destruction of the unity of the common market and jeopardise the cohesion 
of the Community. The Treaty would be deprived of its character as 
Community law.105 The last part of the argument is repeated verbatim from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 In the English language version the French formulation “l’unité et l’efficacité du 
droit Communautaire” is sometimes translated as “uniformity and efficacy of 
Community law” (Internationale Handelsgesselchaft, para 3) and sometimes as “unity and 
efficacy” (Hauer, para 14) or “unity and effectiveness” (Case C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v 
Ministerio Fiscal NYR, para 60).  
102 Robert Schütze, European Constitutional Law (CUP 2012), 414. 
103 Case 4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491, para 13. Judge Pescatore was the 
reporting judge in all three cases. 
104 The Court actually lists the provisions of national constitutions and Member 
States’ national legislation in support. Hauer, paras 20 to 22. 
105 Hauer, para 14. 
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Costa v ENEL.106 In the latter case, the Court held that if the Member States 
were allowed to adopt subsequent unilateral measures inconsistent with the 
EU legal system, the executive force of the Treaty would vary from one 
Member State to another, which would compromise the attainment of the 
Treaty objectives and give rise to discrimination on the basis of nationality, 
prohibited in Article 7 EEC (now Article 18 TFEU, included in Part II 
TFEU, Non-discrimination and Citizenship of the Union). 
Thus, an underlying common goal of individual protection frames and 
informs the entrenchment of human rights as a general principle of EU law 
and the autonomy of the EU system of protection. The coupling of the 
appeal to effectiveness (effet utile) to the demand of the uniformity of 
European law allows the Court to replace the interpretation of the Treaty 
based on consensus (the standard common to the Member States and the 
ECHR) with an autonomous (European) interpretation of the standard of 
human rights protection. The common goal, which justifies a unified 
approach, does not merit an approach based on a standard common to all 
Member States. Hence, the cases not only declare respect for human 
rights, but also the primacy of EU law and supranational judicial authority. 
This additional effect became fully apparent decades later, in Melloni. The 
Court held that:  
 
where an EU legal act calls for national implementing 
measures, national authorities and courts remain free to 
apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights, 
provided that the level of protection provided for by the 
Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity 
and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby compromised.107 
 
V. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION   
 
In this article I have empirically investigated the role of effet utile in the 
case law of the Court. This section summarises the findings and discusses 
their implications. Our discussion has primarily been concerned with the 
Court, but the main conclusions arising from this study relate to the nature 
and techniques of judicial decision making and the maintenance of judicial 
authority in ways which invest these findings with a broader pertinence 
and validity. 
 
Most importantly, the analysis strongly suggests that the law making 
function of effet utile has been narrower than commonly assumed in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Costa v ENEL (n 64), para 3. 
107 Melloni, para 60. For an analysis of the “new formula” see Leonard F M Besselink, 
‘The Parameters of Constitutional Conflict after Melloni’ (2014) 39 EL Rev 531, 547. 
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literature: narrower in terms of time, scope, and judicial confidence.108 The 
Court has used effet utile primarily to balance the developments of abstract 
doctrines and principles with societal concerns. This implies that effet utile 
is not merely a technique of functional (dynamic) interpretation109 or a 
mask for unbridled policy making. Nor is it a tool of judicial innovation. 
Instead, it is a legal judicial means which allows the Court to develop a 
coherent body of case law without risking major political backlash from 
the Member States. 
 
This study’s data has shown that although individual historic effet utile 
cases had a long-lasting and far-reaching impact on EU law, the Court did 
not use effet utile to extend the limits of European competence in all 
directions, nor did it resort to it when the law was exhausted. In fact, the 
most authoritative historic effet utile cases work to mitigate the potential 
impact of allowing any separate, contending, entrenched realm of authority 
based on primacy, direct effect, and human rights. An overwhelming 
majority of effet utile cases concern the protection of the individual, either 
through direct effect, or an autonomous system of protection of 
fundamental rights. A smaller number of such cases consolidate the 
authority of EU law and link it to the rationale of direct effect. Both 
groups of cases gravitate towards the creation of a uniform system of 
remedies, a layer that “truly differentiates the Community legal order from 
the horizontality of classic public international law” 110  and does not 
tolerate separate and diverging standards.  
 
This analysis has also demonstrated that the Court counterpoises an 
insistence on the effet utile of EU law with a willingness to include limiting 
provisions regarding the practical effects of its judgments along with 
rhetorical concessions to national sensitivities.111 It is salient that in almost 
all cases the Court effectively limited the practical effects of proclaimed 
principles. In terms of language used, the Court moderated the explicit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 “[t]he judges explained that this method of interpretation forced their hands to 
entrench the telos in rules of Community law that could be applied in practice. Since 
the union-telos was imbued with normativity, the judges professed that effet utile left 
them without any real margin of discretion.” Rasmussen, The European Court of Justice 
(n 80) 31. See also Lasser (n 20).  
109  In fact, the effet utile reasoning of the Court often does not satisfy the 
requirements of the arguments of second order justification. When is an argument a 
“genuine” argument from consequences? On this issues see generally Neil 
MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law : A Theory of Legal Reasoning (OUP 2005). 
110 Weiler (n 7) 2419.  
111  As already emphasised, the approach taken is empirical. The answer to the 
question regarding whether this approach of the Court is normatively justified will 
therefore be unsatisfactory. It is unjustified if we accept the formalist definition of 
law and the strict separation of law from politics, which also presupposes that 
interpretation without law making is possible and that neutral judicial bodies follow 
the letter of the law.  
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pronouncements of supranational judicial authority and the distinctiveness 
of the supranational legal order by making appeals to the common goals, 
unity and the foundational principles of the EU legal order. Cassis de Dijon, 
Factortame and Becker are exceptions to this pattern, but their context 
indicates that the Court will entrench its authority only when it can safely 
preserve it, usually when the principles are well-established in the case law 
and the case is straightforward in terms of its facts.112 
 
The above findings support the conclusion that the role of effet utile is to 
stabilise the law (the formulation remains linguistically stable over time 
regardless of individual case outcomes) and also to convey an impression of 
doctrinal continuity, effectiveness and relevance. At the same time, the 
rhetorical appeal to effet utile or the effectiveness of EU law is detached from 
the questions of de facto effectiveness in terms of compliance with the rulings. 
 
This has broader, substantial implications for our understanding of how 
courts maintain their authority. In general terms, when courts settle novel 
questions concerning the most fundamental rules, their authority to decide 
such questions is accepted after the questions have arisen and the decision 
has been given; 113 or, in Hart’s famous phrase: all that succeeds is success.114 
The success of international courts depends on the extent to which they 
are able to make their generalisable principles “palatable to the Member 
States concerned.”115 Scholars have noted that the Court’s strategy for 
enhancing the authority of its sphere of law and upgrading its own 
powers 116  was to establish its doctrines gradually, mitigating legal 
innovation either by delaying the full practical effects of established 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Factortame was part of a long saga, beginning with the measures taken by the UK 
against the so-called “quota hopping,” which the Court considered conditionally 
compatible with EU law in previous cases, giving the UK the possibility to pass 
compatible legislation (Case C-3/87 Agegate Ltd [1989] ECR 4459 and Case C-216/87 
Jaderow Ltd [1989] ECR 4509). Becker was decided in 1982, when direct effect was 
well established.  
113 Examples of such subsequent acceptance of the Court’s authority to frame the 
fundamental doctrines of EU law, apart from direct effect, primacy, and human 
rights protection as general principles of EU law, include the principle of liability of 
the Member States for the breaches of Community law, or the principle of 
institutional balance (standing of the European Parliament). While some were 
accepted tacitly, others were explicitly written into the Treaties or Declarations (the 
status of the European Parliament as a privileged applicant was formalised in the 
Maastricht Treaty, in what is now Article 263 TFEU, and the protection of human 
rights culminated in the Charter). Declaration number 17 (Declaration concerning 
primacy) to the Treaties, annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental 
Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon ([2012] OJ C 326/47) explicitly refers 
to “the settled case law of the Court of Justice”. 
114 H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd edn, OUP 2012), 153. 
115 Helfer and Slaughter (n 1) 114.  
116 Burley and Mattli (n 4) 69.  
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principles, 117 or by reiterating formulas which could shift the level of 
discussion away from the facts and the consequences of concrete cases and 
decisions to the long term common goals and interests of integration.118  
 
The present analysis provides empirical support for the existence of this 
rationale of step by step decision making by courts, also referred to as 
incrementalism. In addition, it adds to this discussion by making it explicit how 
the Court employs legal tools to balance the entrenchment of the authority of 
law with the interests of individual Member States.119 This study shows how 
courts, aware of broader societal concerns and interests, construct and extend 
principles and doctrines in individual cases; and it begins the process of 
measuring and assessing the long term consequences of this practice.  
 
In individual cases, the relevant court will use its judicial situational sense 
(or judicial “horse sense”),120 All decisions that disrupt the status quo will 
need to renegotiate the authority of the court by renegotiating and 
reconfirming the authority of the law. Thus, when deciding potentially 
controversial cases a court will counter-balance the proclamation of its 
authority: (1) in the court’s rhetoric/language, and/or (2) in effect, by not 
applying the principle that it established in the same case, qualifying the 
principle that it established in the same case, or not disclosing its full 
potential. This study’s scrutiny of incremental decision making reveals that 
its most common manifestations include decoupling the principle from the 
remedy, temporal delays of the effects of judgments, and repeated appeals 
to fundamental (and common) goals in the form of prefabricated formulas 
and locutions. In the long run, this practice implies that courts will 
develop legal doctrines over time in a series of decisions which exhibit an 
uneven, varying degree of vigour.  
 
This analysis constitutes an improved picture of how courts assert power 
or retreat from power both on the level of outcome and on the level of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 “[I]n the first case that comes before it, the Court will establish the doctrine as a 
general principle but suggest that it is subject to various qualifications; the Court 
may even find some reason why it should not be applied to the particular facts of the 
case. The principle, however, is now established. If there are not too many protests, 
it will be re-affirmed in later cases; the qualifications can then be whittled away and 
the full extent of the doctrine revealed.” Hartley (n 11) 74. 
118 Burley and Mattli (n 4) 68.  
119 For a more recent contribution concerning the incremental decision making of the 
ECrtHR see Shai Dothan, Reputation and Judicial Tactics : A Theory of National and 
International Courts (CUP 2015). For WTO and UN see Venzke (n 16). For a recent 
survey of empirical quantitative studies on how the Court considers the interests of 
the Member States in its decision making see Clifford Carrubba and Matthew Gabel, 
International Courts and the Performance of International Agreements: A General Theory 
with Evidence from the European Union (CUP 2014), 66.  
120 Karl  Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Little, Brown and 
Co. 1960). 
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judicial language in potentially contentious cases. We have been able to 
delve more precisely into how these two levels are intertwined in individual 
judgments and in the building of doctrines, and examine how they sustain 
the authority of the Court in the long run.121  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Incrementalism will work in the face of limited disapproval: the struggle for 
authority is won in debates about legitimacy and in the process of critique and 
defence.  
